I feel that the English language cannot accommodate a strange sort of logical consistency, which is implicit in what I can only label as the clarity of doubt. The premise on which this stands is that of a choice between not knowing the answer to an open question and believing in a manifestly wrong answer to said question. As a result, doubt is the necessary condition in order to reach sufficient scepticism that plays the decisive role in filtering out much of the ambient noise that one is immersed in. The seemingly antithetical nature of this conception is not new, since Descartes explained this a few centuries ago (not to mention the ancients before him). But he did not write in English.
My frustration lies in the subjective observation that virtually everyone I have ever come across in person, for whatever reason, prefers the illogical choice of believing in the wrong answer to an open question. What is worse is the stigma associated with and the peer pressure inflicted on anyone demonstrating the virtues of doubting, dithering, deferring, etc. I say virtues because these are the actions that give one the kind of clarity that leads to an honest admission of the full extent of one’s ignorance (regardless of whether it is guilty or blissful in nature). The boundary of one’s empirically falsifiable knowledge is all that demarcates the burden of belief within from the clarity of doubt beyond. Thus the logical choice of doubting over believing is deductively obvious to too few of us, sadly.